TECHADYANT

INDIA'S LOITERING MUNITIONS MARKET INTELLIGENCE 2026–2035

Who arms India's loitering-munition decade? Demand quantification, category specifications, the supplier map, and the subsystem chokepoints that decide sovereignty.

PERSISTENCE — SEE FIRST

PRECISION — STRIKE TRUE

MASS — OVERWHELM

PROTECT — DENY & DEFEND

INTEGRATE — DECIDE FASTER

Specifications, types, procurement panorama, & industrial implications for India's loitering munitions ecosystem

INDIA'S LOITERING MUNITIONS MARKET INTELLIGENCE 2026-2035

Free condensed edition - Who arms India's loitering-munition decade?

Techadyant Labs

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About This Free Edition

This is the free condensed edition of *India's Loitering Munitions Market Intelligence 2026-2035* from Techadyant Labs. It reproduces the report's standalone Executive Summary in full, so you can read the market, the opportunity, the risks and the strategic conclusions without the paid edition. Figures and tables are drawn from the complete report.

The full ~115-page edition adds the transparent SHAKTIBAAN Demand Model and its 2035 scenarios, the LM-Sovereignty Index across roughly forty subsystems, the six-category specification matrix, the domestic and foreign supplier atlas, the Investment Priority Matrix, the force-structure and operating concepts, and the full procurement, budget and subsystem evidence base.

Executive Summary

The argument in one page

India has entered a ten-year window in which loitering munitions move from the margins of its arsenal to the centre of its land-warfare doctrine — and the decisions that matter most are not about which airframe to buy, but about who will own the layers of the weapon that cannot be seen. Operation Sindoor in 2025 converted a doctrinal debate into a procurement fact: within months the Ministry of Defence had exhausted a ₹9,100 crore emergency-powers ceiling, directed roughly four-fifths of the field-formation tranche to loitering and kamikaze systems, and cleared, through the Defence Acquisition Council in December 2025, a package worth about ₹79,000 crore that for the first time named a "Loiter Munition System for Artillery Regiments." The demand signal is now unambiguous and primary-sourced. What remains contested is the answer to a harder question: when India buys hundreds of thousands of attritable precision weapons over the coming decade, how much of that value — and how much of the sovereignty that is supposed to come with it — will actually be captured at home?

This report argues that India's loitering-munition opportunity is real, large, and structurally mispriced. It is real because the doctrine, the budget, and the industrial base have converged for the first time. It is large because attritable precision is, by design, a volume business measured in inventory depth and replenishment rate rather than one-off platform buys. And it is mispriced because the market's attention sits on the airframe and the prime contractor, while the decisive value and the decisive vulnerability sit two and three tiers below them — in rare-earth magnets, flight controllers, seekers, edge-compute silicon and lithium cells that India still overwhelmingly imports, most of them from a single geopolitical competitor. The central finding is that India can already integrate and assemble world-class loitering munitions, but the layers that determine whether it can *sustain* them under stress remain foreign. Closing that gap — not fielding the next prototype — is the strategic task of the decade.

> **Techadyant thesis.** India's loitering-munition programme will be won or lost below the prime-contractor layer. Airframe sovereignty is close to solved; subsystem sovereignty is not. The country that assembles the munition is not yet the country that could rebuild its supply if the border closed.

Why this report, and why now

Three forces have arrived at the same moment. The first is doctrinal: the evidence from Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and Ukraine since 2022 has settled the argument that cheap, precise, expendable strike systems can impose ruinous costs on expensive conventional formations, and India's planners have absorbed the lesson. The second is fiscal: the Union Budget for 2026-27 raised the defence allocation to ₹7.85 lakh crore, carved out ₹1.85 lakh crore for capital acquisition and earmarked 75 per cent of that — ₹1.39 lakh crore — for domestic procurement, explicitly citing the post-Sindoor emergency purchases. The third is industrial: for the first time India has fielded loitering munitions that are genuinely its own, from the Nagastra family built by Economic Explosives to the Tata ALS-50 and the DRDO ULPGM-V3, alongside licence-built systems such as the Alpha Design–Elbit SkyStriker.

The convergence creates a decade-defining market-formation period whose winners will be chosen in its first three years. This report is written for the decision-makers who must act inside that window: defence planners sizing the requirement, manufacturers positioning for volume, investors pricing defensibility, and the subsystem suppliers and MSMEs who will determine whether India's loitering-munition fleet is sovereign in name or in fact.

What the analysis found — the twenty findings that should shape strategy

The report's evidence base resolves into twenty findings. They are stated here in full so that the Executive Summary can stand alone.

On demand and economics.

1. **The requirement is measured in hundreds of thousands, not hundreds.** Techadyant's SHAKTIBAAN Demand Model — a transparent force-structure build-up rather than a headline guess — points to a ten-year Indian Army requirement in the low-hundreds-of-thousands of units once FPV strike, micro- and short-range categories are included [modelled]. The precise band and its derivation are set out in Part III; the direction is not in doubt.
2. **This is a volume market, not a prototype market.** Value concentrates in the categories that are consumed fastest — FPV and short-range strike — where manufacturing scale and supply-chain resilience, not exquisite capability, decide who wins.
3. **The economic logic of the battlefield has inverted.** A loitering munition costing a few lakh rupees can destroy armour, artillery, radars and command nodes worth crores. The correct

procurement objective is cost-per-effect and replenishment rate, not platform prestige — a shift the report formalises as the Cost-Exchange Efficiency Curve.

4. **The procurement signal is now primary-sourced, and it is specific.** Emergency powers of ₹9,100 crore, a capital emergency tranche of ₹7,074 crore across 29 schemes, and a ₹79,000 crore December-2025 DAC clearance that names an artillery loitering-munition system, together establish demand on the record rather than by inference.
5. **The first three years are decisive.** Phase I, 2026–2028, is the market-formation period. It will set the performance benchmarks, procurement patterns and supplier relationships that the rest of the decade compounds — early capacity capture is worth more than late superiority.

On sovereignty and the supply chain.

6. **India's real vulnerability sits below the prime.** Airframe design, integration, autonomy software and warheads are largely sovereign. The decisive dependencies are deeper: flight controllers, microcontrollers and edge-AI compute, rare-earth magnets, EO/IR seekers, secure datalinks and lithium cells.
7. **The magnet is the deepest chokepoint.** Sintered NdFeB magnets with dysprosium and terbium sit under every electric motor in the fleet; China supplies roughly nine-tenths of the world's finished magnets and placed heavy rare earths under export licensing in April 2025. India's domestic magnet output is negligible today.
8. **The flight controller is the widest chokepoint.** By parliamentary disclosure, close to 90 per cent of India's small-drone flight controllers are imported from China; indigenous efforts exist but remain sub-scale.
9. **The cell is the quietest chokepoint.** Roughly 84 per cent of India's lithium-ion cell imports originate in China; drone volumes are too small to pull domestic cell manufacturing, so packs are assembled locally around foreign cells.
10. **The seeker is the contested frontier.** India's most encouraging indigenisation is in EO/IR seekers — Tonbo Imaging's Trap1 among them — but the thermal detector core itself is still largely imported, so sovereignty today is at the integration layer, not the sensor-fabrication layer.
11. **Navigation is India's structural advantage.** NavIC gives India a sovereign satellite constellation and a genuine edge in anti-jam, GPS-denied guidance that few competitors possess — a strength to build the fleet around.
12. **The remedies exist but arrive on a lag.** The ₹7,280 crore REPM magnet scheme (November 2025) and the ₹34,300 crore National Critical Mineral Mission address the two ends

of the chain, but scheme-scale sovereign sintered NdFeB is unlikely before roughly 2028, leaving a near-term window of exposure.

On industry, policy and investment.

13. **India has a credible indigenous prime layer — and it is consolidating.** Economic Explosives/Solar, Tata Advanced Systems, Alpha Design (Adani), Bharat Dynamics, NewSpace, Zen and Bharat Forge now constitute a real, order-backed domestic supplier base rather than a set of prototypes.
14. **Foreign technology transfer is overwhelmingly Israeli.** Elbit, IAI and now UVision (through the AVision joint venture) route localisation into India; comparable US, Turkish or European loitering-munition primes have not localised here.
15. **Policy is unusually well aligned to the opportunity.** The 75 per cent domestic capital earmark, five positive-indigenisation lists covering 509 items, and the iDEX/ADITI route that produced the combat-proven SkyStriker give vendors a clearer runway than in almost any other defence segment.
16. **The commercial "market" and the programme value are not the same number, and conflating them misleads.** Third-party research sizes India's loitering-munition market at only a few hundred million dollars by 2030; the procurement and programme figures are far larger because they count replenishment and system-of-systems spend the market studies omit. The report keeps the two apart.
17. **New force structures create new buying centres.** Concepts such as the SHAKTIBAAN regiment, the Ashmi platoon, manned-unmanned teaming and distributed kill-webs push demand down from the strategic level to corps, division, brigade, battalion and platoon — a layered market for systems, spares, training, simulation, datalinks, software and sustainment.
18. **Attractiveness and readiness diverge by category.** The report's Category-Attractiveness Matrix shows that India's highest-value categories are not its most-ready ones; the near-term winners are where demand volume and domestic readiness overlap.
19. **The investable opportunity is in the subsystem, not the airframe.** For investors, the defensible positions — and the least-contested returns — sit in magnets, seekers, motors, secure datalinks and edge-compute, precisely the layers the prime contractors do not own.
20. **Sovereignty is a schedule, not a slogan.** Whether India's loitering-munition fleet is sovereign by 2035 depends on a datable sequence: magnets by around 2028, seekers by around 2029, trusted compute by the early 2030s. The report tracks it as the Procurement Sovereignty Clock.

The market opportunity in one view

The table below states the shape of the decade as the analysis reads it. Each figure is either verified against a primary source or explicitly modelled; the report never presents a modelled number as a sourced one.



Figure 1 — Executive dashboard: India loitering-munition demand, budget and sovereignty at a glance.

Table 1 — The opportunity at a glance

Dimension	What the analysis indicates	Strategic implication
Demand character	Low hundreds of thousands of systems over ten years, volume-led [modelled]	Win on manufacturing scale and replenishment, not prototypes
Verified budget frame	₹1.85 lakh cr capital acquisition FY26-27; 75% (₹1.39 lakh cr) domestic-earmarked [V]	A policy-protected domestic runway rare in defence
Named demand signal	DAC ₹79,000 cr package incl. artillery loitering-munition system, Dec 2025 [V]	Demand is on the record, not inferred
Highest-volume categories	FPV and short-range strike	Scale and supply-chain resilience decide winners
Deepest bottleneck	Sintered NdFeB magnets (Dy/Tb), ~90% China-supplied [V]	Subsystem sovereignty outranks airframe sovereignty
Decisive window	2026–2028	Early capacity capture shapes the decade

The eight frameworks this report introduces

A Techadyant Signature report earns its price through proprietary structure, not summarised news. This publication introduces eight original analytical instruments, each reproducible from the underlying data:

The **Loitering-Munition Sovereignty Index (LM-SSI)** scores roughly forty subsystems on India's capability against the global leader and the strategic importance of each, producing a single sovereignty-risk read across eight layers. The **SHAKTIBAAN Demand Model** derives the ten-year requirement from force structure and consumption rather than assertion. The **Attritable-Precision Value Stack (APVS)** shows where the money and the vulnerability sit in a single munition. The **Category-Attractiveness Matrix (LM-CAM)** ranks the six loitering-munition categories on market attractiveness against Indian readiness. The **Cost-Exchange Efficiency Curve (CEEC)** formalises the cost-per-effect logic that should govern procurement. The **Indigenisation Readiness Ladder (IRL)** grades each subsystem's maturity from import to sovereign export. The **Investment Priority Matrix (IPM)** scores the opportunity surfaces for capital. And the **Procurement Sovereignty Clock** sets out, as a datable sequence, what must be true by when for India's fleet to be genuinely its own by 2035.

Industry outlook

India's loitering-munition industry will professionalise and consolidate. The prime layer is already order-backed: Economic Explosives has delivered 480 Nagastra-1 units and won a 450-unit follow-on for the recoverable variant; Tata's ALS-50 has entered service with a first hundred for the Air Force and a further two hundred planned for the Army; the Alpha Design–Elbit SkyStriker is combat-proven; and DRDO's ULPGM-V3 completed development trials in 2026 for production by Bharat Dynamics and Adani. The centre of gravity now shifts from "can India build one" to "can India build them at scale, sustainably, and with a supply chain that does not run through a competitor." Expect the strongest positions to accrue to firms that vertically integrate toward propulsion, seekers and datalinks, and to the ammunition and explosives base — Solar, Munitions India, Bharat Forge — that already owns the one layer the imports cannot touch.

Policy outlook

Policy is, unusually, an accelerant rather than a brake. The 75 per cent domestic capital earmark, the emergency-procurement precedent, the positive-indigenisation lists and the iDEX/ADITI innovation route give the segment a protected runway. The binding constraint is no longer intent but sequencing: the magnet and critical-mineral schemes must convert from tender to tonnage before the demand curve peaks, and procurement design must reward domestic value-addition at the subsystem tier rather than airframe assembly alone — the lesson Turkey encoded as a 75-to-93 per cent domestic-content expectation and India has not yet matched.

Technology outlook

The technology frontier rewards precisely the layers India is weakest in. Electronic-warfare-saturated battlefields have made GPS-denied guidance, anti-jam datalinks, fibre-tethering and onboard autonomy survival requirements rather than features — and each runs through seekers, RF and edge silicon that India imports. The two trajectories most likely to dominate, AI-enabled autonomy and swarming, both raise the premium on India's chokepoints while rewarding its software strength and its NavIC advantage. Sovereignty in the fleet therefore depends on advancing in compute, seekers and magnets even as the doctrine races ahead.



Figure 2 — India loitering-munition capability radar against global benchmarks.

Investment outlook

For capital, the report's clearest conclusion is that the airframe is the crowded trade and the subsystem is the open one. The Investment Priority Matrix points to the least-contested, most-defensible returns in NdFeB magnets, EO/IR seekers and detector integration, secure datalinks, drone-grade motors and edge-AI compute — the layers that every prime needs and none controls. The funding signal already leans this way: Raphe mPhibr's $100 million round, the largest

ever for an Indian aerospace-manufacturing firm, was raised on the strength of in-house propulsion, not airframes. The caution is timing and concentration risk — ideaForge's revenue halving in FY25 is a reminder that the sector is cyclical and procurement-dependent.

The principal risks

Three risks dominate. The first is supply-chain coercion: with magnets, flight controllers and cells concentrated in China, an export-control action of the kind seen in April 2025 could throttle production faster than any domestic remedy can respond, and India's buffer is measured in weeks. The second is assembly-without-sovereignty: the danger that India fields an impressive fleet whose supply it cannot reconstitute under stress — a fleet that looks indigenous and is not. The third is mispriced procurement: buying for platform capability rather than cost-per-effect and replenishment, which would leave India with too few, too-expensive systems for a form of warfare defined by mass.

Three scenarios for 2035

The report models three futures, distinguished by a single variable — whether India invests in the layers it does not yet own. In **Assembly Nation**, India buys and assembles at scale but the subsystem gap persists; the fleet is large and hostage. In **Selective Sovereignty**, the magnet, seeker and compute remedies land on schedule and India owns the layers that matter most while importing the rest by choice, not necessity — the realistic goal. In **Attritable-Precision Power**, India converts sovereignty into an export position on the Turkish model. The difference between them is not technology; it is whether the industrial policy of 2025–2028 is executed.

The bottom line

India does not have a loitering-munition capability problem. It has a loitering-munition sovereignty problem, and a three-year window in which to solve it. The demand is proven, the budget is protected, the primes are real. What is unresolved is whether the value and the security of the fleet will be captured below the airframe, where they actually live. This report maps that terrain — the demand, the categories, the suppliers, the subsystems and the schedule — so that planners, manufacturers and investors can act on the layer that decides the decade, rather than the one that merely flies.

Key opportunities, key risks — a decision-maker's ledger

The following two tables condense the report's opportunity and risk picture into a single ledger for readers who will act before reading further.

Table 2 — The ten highest-conviction opportunities

#	Opportunity surface	Why it is open	Priority window
1	Sintered NdFeB magnets (Dy/Tb)	Deepest chokepoint; REPM scheme + guaranteed defence offtake	2026–2029
2	EO/IR seekers & detector integration	Contested frontier; Tonbo/Paras beachhead; import-substitution prize	2026–2030
3	Trusted flight controllers & autopilots	~90% imported; parliamentary and security pressure to localise	2026–2028
4	Drone-grade BLDC motors & ESCs	Assembly sovereign but magnet-dependent; scales with fleet	2027–2031
5	Secure anti-jam datalinks / SDR	EW battlefield makes this a survival layer	2026–2029
6	Edge-AI compute & trusted silicon	Autonomy/swarm trajectory raises the premium	2028–2033
7	FPV & short-range strike at scale	Highest-volume category; manufacturing-led	2026–2028
8	Counter-UAS integrated into LM fleets	Twin demand; Zen/Paras/BEL positioning	2026–2030
9	Test, certification & sustainment services	Throughput bottleneck; recurring revenue	2026–2031
10	Loitering-munition-specific autonomy software	India's merit layer; NavIC-anchored	2026–2030

Table 3 — The principal risks and their mitigation windows

Risk	Mechanism	Buffer / mitigation	Severity
Supply-chain coercion	China export controls on magnets/cells/FCs (precedent Apr 2025)	Weeks of stock; REPM/NCMM mature ~2028	High
Assembly-without-sovereignty	Fleet fielded on imported subsystems	Subsystem-tier procurement incentives	High
Mispriced procurement	Buying platform capability over cost-per-effect	Adopt cost-exchange/replenishment metrics	Medium-High
Sector cyclicality	Procurement-dependent revenue (cf. ideaForge FY25)	Diversified offtake; export	Medium
Certification throughput	Test/cert capacity caps induction	Expand NTH/CEMILAC-grade capacity	Medium

Table 4 — Domestic supplier snapshot (order-backed positions)

Prime / supplier	Flagship system	Verified position
Economic Explosives / Solar	Nagastra-1 / 1R	480 delivered; 450 1R ordered Jun 2025; >75% indigenous
Tata Advanced Systems	ALS-50	100 with IAF; 200 planned for Army
Alpha Design (Adani)–Elbit	SkyStriker	~100 systems since 2021; Op Sin-door combat use
DRDO / Bharat Dynamics / Adani	ULPGM-V3	Development trials completed May 2026
NewSpace R&T	Sheshnaag-150 / MACKEREL	Swarm LM; deep-strike ambition
Zen Technologies (+TISA)	Counter-UAS + LM entry	54.67% TISA stake, Jul 2025

Read the Full Report

The complete edition of *India's Loitering Munitions Market Intelligence 2026-2035* is available from Techadyant Labs — six parts, seventeen chapters, twenty-five figures and full appendices. Visit labs.techadyant.com/reports/india-loitering-munitions-market to read the online edition or acquire the complete report.